

Graphene:

Securing unmodified Linux Applications with Confidential Computing

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CONFIDENTIAL COMPUTING
CONSORTIUM

The Confidential Computing Consortium

- › Community focused on Open Source licensed projects securing DATA IN USE and accelerating the adoption of confidential computing through open collaboration
- › Announced the intent to form in August at the Open Source Summit North America in San Diego, formally launched on 17 October 2019 with governance in place

Please visit <https://confidentialcomputing.io>

Premier



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Associate





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Confidential Computing




Confidential Computing Definition

*Confidential Computing is the **protection of data in use** by performing computation in a **hardware-based Trusted Execution Environment***


Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)

- A TEE is an environment that provides a level of assurance of three key properties
 - Data Confidentiality
 - Data Integrity
 - Code Integrity
- Hardware based TEE
 - Maps to a secure portion of memory
 - The code and data inside TEE can not be accessed from outside
 - Can prove to 3rd party its identity via attestation
- Most major hardware vendors support TEE
 - **Intel® SGX**, Intel TDX, AMD SEV, ARM TrustZone



Intel® Software Guard Extension (Intel® SGX)

- Intel® SGX provides a set of ISA extensions to build a protected enclave
- Application is split into untrusted app and trusted enclave
- Application builds trusted enclave with well-defined entry points
- Attest enclave fingerprint to 3rd parties for verification and secrets provisioning



Lift and Shift Unmodified Applications

- In un-trusted cloud and edge deployments, there is a strong desire to shield the whole application from rest of the infrastructure
- Developers want end-to-end secure solutions with “push-button” approach
- Graphene supports lift and shift paradigm for unmodified application binaries for CC with Intel SGX

Graphene Overview



Graphene Project Summary

- Technical acceptance by CCC - pending legal review for trademark/naming
- Graphene runs unmodified Linux Applications on other platforms
 - Current focus on Intel® SGX
- Community maintained Open-Source (LGPL) project hosted on Github
- Well defined testing and validation criteria with CI/CD (Jenkins)
- Project maintenance is governed via a well-defined [governance criteria](#)
- Cloud deployment with [Azure Kubernetes Service](#)
- Very actively being developed towards production readiness in Q2'21

Growing Community

intel


Alibaba Cloud


THE UNIVERSITY
of NORTH CAROLINA
at CHAPEL HILL


ATM | TEXAS A&M
UNIVERSITY


IBM


golem


ITL
INVISIBLE THINGS LAB

AI/ML


TensorFlow

OpenVINO™

 PyTorch

Databases


MEMCACHED


redis

Web Servers


LIGHTTPD
fly light.

NGINX


APACHE
HTTP SERVER

Languages


python™


GCC


R


R

Misc


 blender®


node
JS

Graphene Architecture



Graphene Library OS



SUNY Stony Brook
Graphene [EuroSys'14]

Cooperation and Security Isolation of Library OSes for Multi-Process Applications

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


Intel Labs and SUNY Stony Brook
Graphene-SGX [ATC'17]

Graphene-SGX: A Practical Library OS for Unmodified Applications on SGX

Chia-Che Tsai Donald E. Porter Mona Vij
Stony Brook University University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Intel Corporation
and Fortanix

Library OS architecture is very suitable for Intel® SGX



Graphene Shielding Layer

- All security-critical paths are hardened against eavesdropping/attacks
 - Integrity of the loadable libraries is verified via checking against valid hash values
 - Transparent File encryption is supported via protected FS for “protected” files”
 - Migration of checkpointed state from parent to the child process is transparently encrypted for secure fork
 - All Pipes, messages and signals among Graphene processes are encrypted
 - Additional checks in SGX-PAL prevent against ligo attacks
- All network communication is assumed to be SSL/TLS-protected by the app itself

Enabling app in Graphene requires a manifest file

redis.manifest (TOML format)

```
libos.entrypoint = "file:/usr/bin/redis"  
loader.env.LD_LIBRARY_PATH = "/lib"
```

Executable to load into SGX enclave

```
fs.mount.lib.type = "chroot"  
fs.mount.lib.path = "/lib"  
fs.mount.lib.uri = "file:/graphene/Runtime"
```

Environment variables are overwritten

Restrict mount points to a small subset of host-OS directories

```
sgx.enclave_size = "1024M"  
sgx.thread_num = 8
```

SGX-specific limits like the maximum enclave size and number of threads

```
sgx.trusted_files.libc = "file:/graphene/Runtime/libc.so.6"
```

SGX-specific trusted files (securely hashed and verified at load time)

...

Graphene Features for SGX Infrastructure

- SGX Attestation
 - Supports both EPID and DCAP/ECDSA SGX attestations
- Protected Files
 - Automatically encrypt/decrypt specified files in the manifest
- Asynchronous System Calls
 - Exit-less support as a performance enhancement feature
- Multi-process support
 - Fork and secure comm between parent and child process via encrypted IPC
- Docker Integration
 - Automatically convert Docker images to Graphene images

Graphene Remote Attestation



Graphene Remote Attestation

There level approach to [Attestation](#)

- Remote/Local Attestation Support:
 - Exposed via `/dev/attestation` pseudo-filesystem
 - Integrates with multiple backends under the hood including Intel DCAP
- Secure Channel Establishment
 - Constructed using RA-TLS (Remote Attestation integrated with Transport Layer Security)
- Secret Provisioning
 - Built using secret provisioning libraries


Docker Container Integration



Containers are deployment model for cloud

- Containers have become the defacto deployment model besides VMs
 - Small memory footprint
 - Fast startup
- Goals:
 - Provide an interface for automatically securing Docker container applications with SGX with Graphene
 - Minimize burden to craft application manifest


Graphene Shielded Containers (GSC) in a Nutshell





Securing an unmodified workload



End-to-End Secure Machine Learning with Pytorch



End-to-End Use Case using Pytorch



Graphene is actively evolving

- Initial SGX port released in 2017
- Open-source community established in Dec 2018
- First major release was in September 2019
- Difference between current version and that first release (~1.5 years):
 - 1,179 files changed
 - 87,890 insertions, 86,287 deletions
 - 1,143 commits from 34 authors
 - Memory management, threads, processes, signals 99% reworked

Graphene Project Future Plans

- Continue the development towards production readiness in Q2'21
- Improve tooling and documentation
- Integration with future cloud-based container deployments
- Grow supported runtimes and workloads
- Extend to secure communication with accelerators
- Explore addition of future TEE backends

Join our community!

- We welcome contributions of all type from the community!
 - Code
 - Issues
 - Documentation
 - Fruit baskets...
- Try deploying your unmodified Docker workloads with Graphene
 - In your datacenter or cloud
- We want to hear from your experience of using Graphene
 - Email or github issues welcome



Graphene project:
<http://www.grapheneproject.io>

GitHub repo:
<https://github.com/oscarlab/graphene>

Graphene Documentation:
<https://graphene.readthedocs.io/en/latest/>



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